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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),'
fear of hazardous waste pollution liability has thwarted count-
less business deals.2 In almost any commercial real estate
transaction, the specter of astronomically high environmental
liability haunts and often dictates the process and structure of
these transactions.3
* B.A. 1986, Whitman College. J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Puget Sound
School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988).
For the legislative history of CERCLA, see SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILrTY ACT OF 1980 (SuPERFuND), 97th Cong., 2d.
Sess. (1983). In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amendment
and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. Several commentators have spoken on the rise in environmental liability and
the effect of CERCLA on business deals. See, e.g., Ruth Simon, Deals that Smell Bad,
FORBES, May 15, 1989, at 49 (describing CERCLA as "the harshest liability scheme
around"); Business Community Faces Liability Risks from Transactions Affected by
Waste Laws, 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 347 (Feb. 29, 1988); Alison Kittrell, Bigger
Liability Risks Alter Business Routines, Bus. INS., Jan 23, 1989, at 30; William
Anderson, II & Melinda E. Taylor, Representing Buyers, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3
(Fall 1988).
3. The prospect of CERCLA liability lurks in all sorts of land uses. The following
list of businesses or industries may involve environmentally hazardous activities:
a) agriculture: farms; orchards and groves; vineyards; nurseries; fertilizer and
pesticide manufacturers and distributors; lumber, wood processing, pulp and paper
mills; animal feed lots; grain mills; and meat, dairy, and food processing plants.
b) manufacturing: foundries; iron and steel plants; heavy equipment, machinery and
motor vehicle manufacturers and servicers; aerospace industries; electroplating
industries; computer and semi-conductor manufacturers; glass and asbestos
handlers and insulation manufacturers; textiles companies; cement plants;
tanneries; rubber plants; battery manufacturers; and paint industries.
c) petroleum and chemical manufacturing: oil refineries and tank farms; organic
chemical producers and suppliers; plastics and synthetics manufacturers; soap and
detergent producers; and industrial gas, acid, and caustics producers.
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Although estimates of the scope of hazardous waste pollu-
tion and individual site cleanup costs vary widely, the esti-
mates continue to increase. In 1980, one U.S. Representative
speaking in support of CERCLA's enactment cited the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) $44 billion estimate to
clean up approximately 30,000 to 50,000 abandoned hazardous
waste sites across the country. 4 Nine years later, a congres-
sional report stated that "[o]ver many decades, spending by all
parties on cleaning up toxic waste sites could total $500 billion,
unless there are major technological innovations that bring the
costs of permanent remedies down."'5  Regarding individual
sites, one commentator estimated that the average cost of
cleaning up a contaminated site would be approximately $8
million.6 A more recent estimate of individual site cleanup
costs indicates that "[a]s a national average, the cost of a fed-
eral Superfund site clean-up exceeds $20 million."7
In light of these estimates, even the smallest environmen-
tal problem can turn a good bargain into a debilitating liability.
Naturally, fears of environmental liability may profoundly
influence bargaining table dialogue. Because the cost and inci-
dence of hazardous waste contamination are soaring and
because the courts favor broad interpretations of CERCLA's
liability provisions,8 counsel for prospective purchasers of com-
d) transportation: airports; railroad yards; oil and gas pipelines; trucking terminals;
harbors; and asphalt plants.
e) waste disposal: waste transfer stations; waste treatment facilities; landfills; and
scrap yards.
f) commercial: photochemical laboratories; gasoline and automobile service/repair
stations; car, truck, bus and heavy equipment fleet service facilities; dry cleaners;
printing operations; paint distribution and sales outlets; and automobile dealerships.
g) energy: gas, oil-fired, and nuclear power plants.
Joyce Michelson, Hazardous Waste in Real Estate Transactions: "Lenders' Concerns"
700, 718-19 (1991 Environmental Law and Management Conference, University of
Washington, Apr. 4-5, 1991) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
4. 126 CONG. REC. 26,360 (Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Railsback). See also
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
5. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMING CLEAN,
SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED . . . 6 (1989).
6. Steven Semeraro, Toward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 226, 238 (1986-87).
7. PRESTON, THORGRIMSON, SHIDLER, GATES, & ELLIS, WASHINGTON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 277 (Bradley M. Marten & Konrad J. Liegel eds.
1990).
See also Marianne Lavelle, Setting Sights on Superfund, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1991,
at 1. The author states that the average site cleanup cost approaches $25 million
dollars.
8. See L. De-Wayne Layfield, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal
[Vol. 15:469
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mercial real estate must take certain prepurchase precautions
to minimize potential CERCLA liability. This Comment pro-
vides practical suggestions as to the aim and form of those
precautions.
In Part II, this Comment first examines the basic statutory
framework and liability scheme of CERCLA. Part III dis-
cusses the common law principles of successor liability and
their relation to CERCLA's liability mechanism. Finally, in
Part IV, this Comment presents a variety of preventive law
steps to lessen exposure to hazardous waste liability under
CERCLA.
Part IV begins by discussing buyers' and sellers' goals
when negotiating a real estate purchase and the environmental
risks that generally inhere in such a transaction. Part IV then
demonstrates in successive subsections how to identify, evalu-
ate, and allocate the risks of a specific purchase. This Com-
ment provides examples of a condition, representations, and an
indemnification clause, all of which may serve as protective
devices in real estate contracts to allocate these risks. Part IV
also considers how courts in four recent cases have responded
to buyers' and sellers' attempts to enforce indemnity clauses to
avoid CERCLA liability.
II. THE LEGAL UNIVERSE OF CERCLA
A. The Purposes of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 with two main objec-
tives in mind. First, Congress wanted to provide the federal
government with a powerful, effective device to secure the
health and safety of the public and to protect the environment
from the threat of hazardous waste mismanagement.9 Second,
through strong liability provisions, Congress intended to place
the cleanup burden upon those responsible for existing con-
tamination and to deter future contamination.' 0
Common Law: Responding to an Uncertain Standard, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1237, 1244
(1990).
9. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,950 (Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio); H.R. 7020,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 3, 1980); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34
(1980); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982) (noting Congress gave the federal government "the tools necessary for a prompt
and effective response to [these environmental] problems.").
10. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1989); Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA was a response by
Congress to the threat to public health and the environment posed by the widespread
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In their attempts to honor these broad objectives, courts
have recognized that Congress left the statute incompletely
written and that Congress intended the judiciary to perform
interstitial lawmaking." In particular, the lack of congres-
sional guidance regarding CERCLA's liability provisions has
created a large degree of uncertainty among the courts and
commentators, making it difficult to determine uniform stan-
dards regarding successor liability or environmental due dili-
gence.' 2 To accomplish Congress' policy objectives, the Act
establishes two complementary enforcement mechanisms:
public suits brought by the federal government 3 and private
suits brought by individuals.'4
B. The Liability Scheme of CERCLA
1. Potentially Responsible Parties
According to section 9607, CERCLA's main pronounce-
ment on liability, the following four actors, known as "poten-
tially responsible parties" (PRPs),15 may be held liable for
use and disposal of hazardous substances. Its purpose was to ensure the prompt and
effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and to assure that parties responsible for
hazardous substances bore the cost of remedying the conditions they created."). Reilly
Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112; see also 126 CONG. REc. 31,951 (Dec. 3, 1980); S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92
(3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987). See also Richard F. Chatfield-Taylor, Successors Beware:
Expanding the Liability Net Under CERCLA Section 9607(a) Through Application of
Exceptions to the Traditional Common-Law Doctrine of Successor Nonliabilty in
Asset Acquisitions, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 442, 470 (1990).
Support for gapfilUing by federal common law was buoyed by Congress's explicit
authorization for courts to apply federal common law in contribution actions. See 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(C) (1988), and for the Act's legislative history, see 126 CONG. REc.
30,932 (November 24, 1980).
12. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 92; Layfield, supra note 8.
See also text infra accompanying notes 46, 99, and 104.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). Section 9607 provides in relevant part:
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate;
"comparable maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
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toxic cleanup costs: (1) the owner/operator of the site at the
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with
the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises
from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
(e) Indemnification, hold harmless, etc., agreements or conveyances;
subrogation rights.
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or
conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator
of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a
release or threat of release under this section, to any other person the
liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall
bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to
such agreement for any liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1)
of this subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or
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time of disposal, 6 (2) generators who arranged for disposal, 7
(3) transporters, i8 and (4) present owners of the site. 9 In the
past, entities falling within these four categories have included
individual plant supervisors,20 parent corporations,21 officers
22212and stockholders, successor corporations,23 lessors, lessees,'
trustees,26 realtors, 7 and lenders.2 These PRPs may be liable
for all removal and cleanup costs, including incidental related
costs for the cleanup, and damages to the environment from
the hazardous releases.'
This Comment focuses on the last of these four PRPs-
present owners of the site. Liability may attach to a recent
successor/purchaser ("a present owner") by mere ownership
without consideration of who actually polluted the site.'
Because of CERCLA's structure, the federal government may
sue any PRP, including the PRP with the deepest pocket, for
cleanup costs. Therefore, every buyer, soon to be a present
owner, must be on the alert for possible contamination and
operator or any other person subject to liability under this section, or
a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise
against any person.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). For an example of a court holding a former site
owner liable for response costs, see Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D.
Idaho 1986).
17. 42 U.S.C. 96076(a)(3) (1988). For an example of a court holding a generator
liable for response costs, see United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361
(D.N.H. 1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. 96076(a)(4) (1988). For an example of a court holding a transporter
liable for response costs, see United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
19. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4) (1988). For an example of a court holding a current owner
liable for response costs, see United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162
(C.D. Mo. 1985).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579
F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
22. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989).
24. United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
25. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1986).
26. United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
27. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988).
28. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1988).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), (D) (1988). See also United States v. Argent Corp., 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984); United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F.
Supp. 1301, 1318 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
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CERCLA's strict liability standard.3 ' This standard is the
starting point for the drafting techniques discussed later in
Part IV of this Comment.
2. Stating a Claim and the Burden of Proof
To state a claim under CERCLA, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant is (1) a person (2) who is in some way
responsible for (3) a release12 of (4) a hazardous substance 3 (5)
in a facility' (6) from which there has been a release or
threatened release of the substance (7) to which the plaintiff
has taken the necessary response actions consistent with the
National Contingency Plan.' In an action by the government
to recover cleanup costs, the burden of proof is on the PRP to
show that it was not responsible for the release or that the
costs incurred by the government were not consistent with the
National Contingency Plan.'
3. Defenses
The statute provides the PRP with the following three
limited defenses to liability: (1) an act of God, (2) an act of
war, or (3) an unforeseeable act or omission by an unrelated
31. United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 2167, 2168 (C.D. Cal. 1984). See
also Howard L. Shecter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is It
A Myth?, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137, 153 (1986); Tanglewood East Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
32. CERCLA broadly defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
33. CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" by reference to lists in other
environmental statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). Nota bene: this definition
excludes petroleum and petroleum products.
34. CERCLA defines "facility" as "any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle,
rolling stock, or aircraft, or any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located .... 42
U.S.C. § 9601(a) (1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The National Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R.
§§ 300.1-.86 (1988), governs the cleanup of polluted sites. Issued by the EPA under
Congress's directive in CERCLA at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(31), 9605 (1988), the NCP
provides specific guidelines for responding to hazardous substance difficulties and for
coordinating the remedial efforts of federal or state agencies and private persons.
36. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989). The court
held that the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that removal or remedial
actions undertaken by the federal or state governments were inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan. Id. A private party bringing an action must prove, as
element of its prima facie case, that costs incurred were consistent with the plan.
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third party.37 In 1986, when Congress amended CERCLA, leg-
islators attempted to develop another exception to the Act's
liability provisions for innocent landowners.38 By redefining
the term "contractual relationship," 9 Congress created the
"innocent landowner" defense from the last of the three
defenses in section 9607(b).'
As an affirmative defense, the innocent landowner provi-
sion places the burden on the defendant to establish six ele-
ments4 by a preponderance of the evidence.' Since its
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See supra note 15 for text of subsection (b).
38. Franklin C. Huntington, IV & Christopher P. Davis, Liability Under CERCLA
for Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, in 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE:
MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION § 14.01(8)(b)(ii) (Christopher P.
Davis & Jeffrey C. Bates eds., 1990).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A) & (B) (1988) provide in relevant part:
(A) The term "contractual relationship," for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3)
of this title, includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on
which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant
after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at
the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i)
.. . is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which
is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on,
in, or at the facility.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in
clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For
purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account any
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely
presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection.
40. "The innocent landowner defense is an amalgam of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) and
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A) and (B)." United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (D. Idaho 1986).
41. In Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, the district court established the following six
requirements for this defense, the first four of which are based on the text of the 1980
version of the Act and the last two on the 1986 amended version:
1. The release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the resulting
damages were caused solely by an act or omission of a third party;
2. The third party's act or omission did not occur in connection with a
contractual relationship (either direct or indirect) with the defendants;
3. The defendants exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance;
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creation, few courts have issued rulings on this defense.43 At
first glance, the defense appears to be an attractive device to
shield buyers from CERCLA liability; however, in cases raising
the defense, most defendants have failed to meet its strict
requirements." This difficulty exists in part because of the
courts' broad interpretation of the term "contractual relation-
ship ' 4' and because no accepted regulatory standard estab-
lishes the requisite level of "due diligence. '
The innocent landowner defense pertains directly to the
subject of this Comment-minimizing a buyer's postpurchase
liability for prepurchase contaminations of property. By fol-
lowing the measures suggested in Part IV of this Comment,
one may possibly establish the requisite due diligence although
no particular formula will always satisfy the due diligence
requirements. Satisfaction depends upon a variety of factors
and is decided on a case-by-case basis.47 As a result, the buyer
may rarely rest assured that he or she has met this strict stan-
4. The defendants took precautions against the third party's foreseeable acts
or omissions and the foreseeable consequences resulting therefrom.
5. That at the time [of purchase, the defendants] did not know and had no
reason to know of that there were [hazardous substances on the property];
and
6. That [the defendants] made all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property.
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 716 F. Supp. at 1346-48. See also PRESTON rr AL., supra note
7, at 280.
42. Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
43. J.B. Ruhl, The Third-Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowing
the Contractual Relationship Exception, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 300 (1988).
44. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho
1989). In Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, the court held that the defense was available to
the defendants. Id. at 1350. For a case where the defense was inapplicable, see
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Cal. 1987). For other
cases interpreting this defense, see Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. at 529; Jersey City
Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987); United States v. Serafini,
706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H.
1988); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
45. The term of art "contractual relationship" is found in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(A) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 39. For a case in which courts
interpret this term, see O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
46. The requisite level of due diligence inquiry depends on the circumstances,
including the purchaser's special knowledge or experience, commonly known or
discoverable information about the site, the conspicuousness of the presence or
likelihood of contamination, and the efficiency of an inspection. PRESTON ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 280.
47. See Pacidfc Hide & Fur Depot, 716 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
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dard; the innocent landowner defense is not as safe a harbor as
it might seem.
4. Strict Liability, and Joint and Several Liability
Apart from the above defenses, courts now unanimously
hold that section 9607 imposes strict liability for any release.48
Also, nearly all courts have held that defendants are jointly
and severally liable.49 To fall within an exception to the rule
of joint and several liability, a party must show that the harm
is divisible or that some basis exists for apportioning the costs
among the PRPs.se
5. Third Party Contribution
Section 9613(f), entitled "Civil Proceedings-Contribu-
tion," also relatei to liability.5' Before 1986, courts debated
whether a PRP could bring a third party suit for contribution
against another actor who also may have violated CERCLA's
provisions.52 Originally, CERCLA made no specific mention of
48. "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though
an explicit provision for strict liability was not included." New York v. Shore Realty,
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1988). CERCLA's legislative history reveals discussion and compromise
regarding whether to impose strict liability. See 126 CoNG. REc. 31,965 (1980).
49. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (D.C. Pa. 1983) (holding that
joint and several liability should be imposed upon the defendants found responsible
unless they can establish that a reasonable basis exists for apportioning the harms
among all of them). See also O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
50. O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 724.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988) ("Civil Proceedings"). Subsection f provides in relevant
part:
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable
... under section 9607(a) of the title, during or following any civil action
under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title .... In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person
to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under
section 9606 or section 9607 of this title.
52. The majority of courts generally recognized an implicit right in CERCLA
defendants to sue for contribution. See, e.g., Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616
F. Supp. 27 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (recognizing a right to contribution among joint tort-
feasors under CERCLA). Accord Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C.
Colo. 1985). But see United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 229
(D.C. Mo. 1985) (holding that neither federal common law nor CERCLA supported
claims for contribution).
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rights to contribution from other responsible parties.' After
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA (entitled the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act or SARA), Congress
codified an explicit provision for contribution claims for CER-
CLA defendants.- This new addition to the statutory scheme
is significant; it allows the EPA to focus on prosecution with-
out becoming entangled in finding all the PRPs.' The EPA
may not want or need to pursue all of the PRPs. However, the
right to contribution from other PRPs encourages a defendant
to bring other PRPs into the suit with the hope of sharing
response costs if they are held liable.
As a result of its breadth, CERCLA's liability scheme
empowers the federal government as well as private parties to
respond quickly to hazardous contaminations and then to allo-
cate the costs to a large number of PRPs. The liability scheme
is much broader than any of the other environmental stat-
utes.57 Because the statute was so hastily written,' the courts
are still filling gaps after twelve years of litigation. Further-
more, because nearly all efforts by attorneys to create defenses
to mollify the statute's effects have failed,59 prepurchase, con-
tractual allocation of risks is critical.
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY DOCTRINE6°
A. Common Law Rules and Policies
Any discussion of a buyer's guidelines to minimize expo-
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); see also supra note 15.
54. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). See In re Charter Co., 862 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir.
1989). See also supra note 51.
56. See C0arter, 862 F.2d at 1502 (two parties against whom CERCLA § 9613
response cost suits were filed had not been named parties in all the related lawsuits).
57. Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45
Bus. LAW. 923, 924 (May 1990).
58. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988); Lavelle, supra note 7, at 36-37.
59. Lavelle, supra note 7, at 36-37.
60. Successor liability doctrine has developed most elaborately in the corporate
context. See 15 WiLuIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7133 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). Although the focus of
this Comment is to provide negotiation and drafting guidelines for all types of
commercial real estate purchases, Part III-A discusses the rules of successor liability
only in the context of corporate purchases. These rules bear on the topic of this
Comment because a large portion of commercial real estate transactions will occur
between corporate buyers and sellers. Many of the guidelines later presented in Part
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sure to hazardous waste liability must include a discussion of
successor liability in general and in relation to CERCLA. By
definition, a buyer of commercial real estate becomes a succes-
sor to the seller's interest in that real estate. Depending on
the form and process of the purchase, the buyer may or may
not succeed to the seller's liabilities, including pollution
liabilities.
The doctrine of successor liability developed outside of any
statutory scheme. As a general rule, when one corporation
sells or transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the
buyer/transferee is not liable for the debts and obligations of
the seller/transferor.61 However, courts have traditionally rec-
ognized four exceptions to this rule of successor nonliability:62
1) when the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the seller's liability,' 2) when the purchase is a de facto
merger or consolidation,' 3) when the purchase is a mere con-
tinuation of the seller's activities,' or 4) when the transfer of
IV have been culled from observations of the principles established in this corporate
context.
61. See FLETCHER, supra note 60, at § 7122; See also Smith v. Chesapeake & 0.
Canal Co., 39 U.S. 45 (1840); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Florum
v. Elliot Mfg. Co., 629 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Colo. 1986); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 102 Wash.
2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
62. See FLErCHER, supra note 60. For a recent discussion of these exceptions, see
Conway v. White Trucks, Div. of White Motor Corp., 885 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989).
63. For cases involving express assumptions of liability, see Keller v. Clark Equip.
Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984) (stating that
terms of the agreement evidence express intent to assume liability); R.J. Enstrom
Corp. v. Interceptor, 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977) (generally discussing the exception).
For a case in which the court found an implicit assumption of liability, see
Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(discussing factors that support finding an implicit assumption of successor liability).
64. See, e.g., Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1457-58 (11th
Cir. 1985); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Fehl v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939 (D. Del 1977).
The following elements are required for a de facto merger:
1) continuity of business operations between the transferee and the transferor
corporations, including continuity of management, employees, location, and assets;
2) continuity of shareholders;
3) cessation of operations by the transferor corporation and dissolution within a short
time; and
4) uninterrupted assumption by the transferee corporation of those liabilities of the
transferor corporation which are necessary for the continuation of normal business
operations.
FLETCHER, supra note 60, at § 7124.20.
65. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that
the test is not the continuation of the business operation but the continuation of the
corporate entity and indicating that the indicia of a continuation are: a) common
identity of stock, directors, and stockholders, and b) existence of only one corporation
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assets is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.6
In more recent years, certain courts have expanded these
exceptions to include two new theories to impose successor lia-
bility on purchasers: 1) the "product line" theory 7 and 2) the"continuing business enterprise" exception." Courts in a few
states, including Washington, have accepted these newer
exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability. 9 Most
state and federal courts, however, continue to apply only the
traditional exceptions.70
Although the doctrine of successor non-liability and the
exceptions embody competing policies,7 ' they do not preclude a
at the completion of the transfer); Goldstein v. Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D. IlI.
1978) (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977)).
66. See, e.g., Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988)
(reorganization begun with fraudulent intent to escape liabilities); United States v.
Plastic Electro-Finishing Corp., 313 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding that
transaction intentionally undertaken to defraud creditors).
67. The product line theory is an exception developed by the Supreme Court of
California in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). "[A] party which acquires a
manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of products under the
circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the
same product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which
the business was acquired." Id at 11. In Washington, the supreme court adopted the
Ray product line exception in Martin v. Abbott Lab., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 386
(1984).
68. The continuing business enterprise theory was originally announced by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 822-23 (N.J.
1981). This theory imposes liability on a successor manufacturer that preserves the
same management, employees, plant, and product. The test for this exception has been
formulated to include such factors as:
1) continuity of employees, supervisory personnel, and physical location;
2) production of the same product;
3) retention of the same name;
4) continuity of general business operations;
5) purchaser holding itself out as a continuation of the seller.
Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. The states adopting the new exceptions are California, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 3; Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 811;
Dawejko v. Jorgenson Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1981); Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). These two new exceptions arose
because the traditional exceptions were geared for corporate law principles rather
than the particular circumstances of products liability claimants. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d
at 609, 689 P.2d at 385.
70. FLrcHER, supra note 60, at §§ 7122-7123. Layfield, supra note 8, at 1247-48.
71. Generally, courts tend to protect corporate creditors and dissenting
shareholders, although they also respect the policy recognizing separate and distinct
corporate entities. See Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 241 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J.
1968); see also Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977).
Courts and secondary authorities have suggested several arguments in opposition
to the imposition of successor liability. A buyer should not be held liable for the
seller's prepurchase "sins." The buyer did not originally create the risk of injury of
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buyer and seller from distributing the risks of a transaction.72
Part IV of this Comment provides guidance on precisely how
to distribute these risks.
B. Successor Liability Doctrine in the CERCLA Context
Given CERCLA's broad liability scheme that may hold
any and all PRPs liable, the courts' adoption of successor liabil-
ity notions seems reasonable. At this point in CERCLA's com-
mon law history, however, no uniform standard exists to
determine the liability of successor purchasers.73 The statute
gives no explicit direction regarding CERCLA's relation to suc-
cessor liability.74 The only formal discussion by the EPA of
the relationship between successor liability and the statute
appeared in a 1984 "Enforcement Memorandum. '75  In the
which a party now complains. The buyer did not reap any of the profits obtained in
the past from prepurchase sale of the seller's property, product, or service. The buyer
was not in a position, prior to acquisition, to alleviate the risk or to take safety
precautions. And, the buyer did not represent that the property, product, or service
was safe. FLETcHER, supra note 60, at § 7123.05 and cases cited therein. See also
Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. 1979).
On the other hand, several arguments favor imposing successor liability. Perhaps
most importantly, an inflexible application of the general rule would allow
corporations to enter into transactions solely to avoid liability. Courts could not
otherwise impose liability on the successor, generally the deeper pocket after the sale,
despite the harmful effects of the service or product. Persons injured by the product
or service have no recourse against the successor corporation. The buyer rather than
the general public is better equipped to insure against these risks and to spread the
costs of the product's or service's harms. If the predecessor's line of business is
continued, the successor, having reaped the benefits of continuing the product/service
line should bear the burden of continuity. No reason exists for distinguishing between
the effects of a cash purchase of corporate assets and an acquisition of assets for stock.
Without successor liability, the purchase of a predecessor's assets leaves a potential
plaintiff with no remedy against the original manufacturer or wrongdoer. Public
policy mandates the imposition of successor liability because the doctrine forces the
seller and buyer to spread the risk of harm between themselves without letting it fall
upon innocent third-parties. See FLETcHER, supra note 60, at § 7123.05 and cases cited
therein.
72. Grant-Howard Assoc. v. Gen. Housewares Corp., 472 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984).
73. See Layfield, supra note 8, at 1246 (discussing the "inability to predict whether
CERCLA [successor] liability will attach"). The Layfield Comment recognizes three
doctrinal approaches to the question of CERCLA successor liability: 1) no successor
liability; 2) traditional successor liability in which assets and liabilities are transferred
separately with the four exceptions; and 3) expanded successor liability, which
includes the product line and continuing business enterprise theories (see supra text
accompanying notes 65-66).
74. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
75. Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Liability of Corporate Shareholders
and Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites under the Comprehensive
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memo, the agency stated that CERCLA successor liability
could be established by several legal approaches: 1) the contin-
uing business enterprise exception, under which a corporation
continues the same business as the seller, and 2) the four tradi-
tional exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability,
as outlined above.76
Because of the limited statutory or agency guidance on
how to hold successors liable under CERCLA, courts have
acted to fill this void. Some courts have held successor pur-
chasers liable when the transaction occurs in the context of a
merger or consolidation.77 Many courts have held successors
liable when the transaction fits one of the four traditional
exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability.78 Only one
court has held a successor purchaser liable when the transac-
tion corresponded to the elements of the expanded product
line exception.79
Since the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Smith Land & Improvement Corp v. Celotex Corp.,' courts
generally apply the four traditional exceptions."' One cause
for this trend was the court's plea in Smith Land that "[iun
resolving the successor liability issues . . . the court[s] ...
must consider national uniformity; otherwise, CERCLA aims
may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice to arrange
a merger or consolidation under the laws of particular states
which unduly restrict successor liability."'82
For example, in a recent decision on CERCLA successor
liability, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., the Ninth Cir-
cuit heeded this plea for national uniformity and applied only
the four traditional exceptions.83 Echoing the Third Circuit's
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (June 13, 1984) (on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
76. Id.
77. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 86.
78. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985)
(applying both the "de facto merger" and "assumption of liabilities" doctrines).
79. Dep't of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 419 A.2d 1151 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1980).
80. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). See also supra
text accompanying note 74.
81. See Layfield, supra note 8, at 1246; see also Chatfield-Taylor, supra note 11, at
448-49.
82. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir.
1988), cert denied, 448 U.S. 1029 (1989).
83. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the facts did not justify finding the
successor liable when none of the four traditional exceptions applied).
1992]
484 University of Puget Sound Law Review
rationale, the Ninth Circuit stated: "A state law which unduly
limits successor liability could cut off the EPA's ability to seek
reimbursement from responsible parties for cleaning up a haz-
ardous waste site under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604 and 9607." 4 In
Asarco, the Ninth Circuit also mentioned the expanded ver-
sions of successor liability but did not address their applicabil-
ity because they were not raised on appeal.a1
One court, however, has refused to apply successor liabil-
ity doctrines in a CERCLA suit. In Anspec Co. v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., a Michigan district court rejected the traditional
exceptions embraced in Asarco and earlier CERCLA cases.s"
After referring to the Smith Land call for the common law
development of successor liability, 7 the district court pro-
ceeded to reject that plea, insisting that "the courts should not
deviate from the four existing categoriesss of potentially liable
parties which Congress clearly mandated under CERCLA."' 9
The district court strictly interpreted CERCLA's liability
framework:
Even though this Court may agree that successor liability is
desirable, that is a legislative policy decision to be made by
Congress .... Congress must still be satisfied with the four
categories since no changes were made to the basic structure
of CERCLA during the 1986 amendments . . . . While
changes to the categories of potentially liable parties may be
necessary, Congress must be the body to make such
changes.9
By limiting the scope of liable parties, the Anspec court's
approach certainly favors buyers of contaminated property, but
few courts have accepted this narrow interpretation of the stat-
ute's liability provisions. Similarly, on the other extreme of
84. Id. at 1263 n.2.
85. Id at 1264 n.3. To this date, only one court has applied the nontraditional
exceptions in the CERCLA setting. Dep't of Transp. v. PSC Resources, 419 A.2d 1151
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (noting the harsh consequences that had occurred from
strict application of the traditional exceptions and applying the new product line
exception).
86. 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989), appeal dismissed without opinion, 891 F.2d
289 (6th Cir. 1989).
87. Id. at 795.
88. The four categories of parties subject to CERCLA liability are present owner/
operators, past owner/operators, generators, and transporters. See supra notes 15-19
and accompanying text.
89. Anspec Co., 734 F. Supp. at 796.
90. Id at 795-96.
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the liability spectrum represented by the product line and con-
tinuing business enterprise exceptions, few courts have
accepted such a broad interpretation of section 9607. Most
courts, like the Ninth Circuit in Asarco, have accepted the
Smith Land approach, holding buyers liable if one of the four
traditional exceptions applies.
By recognizing these four exceptions, courts have broad-
ened the original scope of CERCLA liability and the class of
PRPs. Therefore, when a corporate succession involves real
estate, corporate buyers must be on the alert for the additional
risks presented by these exceptions.91
IV. BUYER'S PREVENTIVE LAW MEASURES TO AVOID
CERCLA LIABILITY
A. Introduction and General Transactional Setting
In one sense, negotiating the purchase of commercial real
estate is a function of resolving the sellers' and buyers' con-
flicting aims. To some degree, each party must adjust its bar-
gaining position to accommodate disparate objectives.
Therefore, before taking affirmative steps toward buying prop-
erty, a purchaser must be aware of the setting and climate in
which the bargaining will take place, the risks facing each
party, and the general objectives of each.92
Traditionally, real estate transfers occur in three major
stages: 1) negotiation and execution of a purchase and sale
agreement; 2) satisfaction of each party's conditions, including
a title examination and financing arrangements; and 3) clos-
ing.93 Each party's goals and expectations shape these mile-
stones and the resulting agreement. Awareness of each side's
91. In addition to the preventive law methods discussed in the next section of this
Comment, corporate successors may also structure the acquisition to avoid successor
liability. See, e.g., John P. Arness, L. Anthony Sutin, Teresa C. Plotkin, Preventing
Successor Liability for Defective Products: Safeguards for Acquiring Corporations, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 353 (1989); Howard L. Shecter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Without
Successor Liability: Is It A Myth?, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137 (1986).
92. Many of the following suggestions regarding the bargaining process pertain to
other federal environmental protection statutes as well. See Federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976); Federal Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1977); Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1977);
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136w (1988);
Federal Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
93. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (3d ed. 1987).
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objectives prepares the buyer to negotiate effectively for a val-
uable purchase.
During these stages, two of the buyer's main goals are to
purchase the land at a fair market value and to protect against
hazardous waste pollution liabilities. To assist the buyer in
reaching these two goals, the buyer's counsel must take several
preliminary steps. Counsel must first pinpoint and evaluate
any environmental risks that could affect the course of the
negotiation. Counsel must then present the client with a vari-
ety of legal means to minimize the transfer of these risks after
purchase. Counsel should confirm that the seller has notified
the appropriate agencies of the upcoming sale and arranged for
the transfer of all necessary agency permits. Lastly, counsel
should establish a mechanism for resolving postpurchase dis-
putes between the seller and buyer.
To achieve these broad goals, buyer's counsel needs full
access and ample time to investigate the property, perform a
complete assessment, and prepare for the negotiation stage.
During the initial investigatory stage, the buyer should expect
full disclosure and candid responses from the seller regarding
the site's environmental compliance history. Later, during the
negotiation stage, the buyer should seek the broadest possible
representations and warranties from the seller as to the past
and present condition of property and as to known and
unknown liabilities.' The buyer's counsel wants to ensure
that if the buyer is later sued, the seller will share any dam-
ages and have sufficient funds to cover those damages. Ulti-
mately, buyer's counsel must use the information gathered
during the investigation to advise the buyer whether to
purchase the real estate and, if so, to suggest bargaining
approaches to negotiate the fairest price.
The buyer's and seller's goals directly conflict. Generally,
the seller aims to sell the property at the highest possible price
and to leave all environmental liabilities behind after closing.
When contemplating a postpurchase status, the seller seeks to
maximize the transfer of risks, whereas the buyer endeavors to
minimize these risks.
Before the buyer begins an investigation, the seller may
have already investigated the property so that the buyer does
not embarrass the seller by discovering some unknown con-
tamination. Although the seller's inspection may not be as
94. See infra Part IV, § B(2)b: "Representations and Warranties."
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thorough as the buyer's, it will help prepare the seller for the
bargaining table. The seller will want the buyer's inspection to
proceed as quickly as possible. The seller may also consider
requesting the buyer to keep any findings confidential.
Fear of alarming a prospective buyer may lead a seller to
refrain from fully disclosing all information relating to
releases. Instead, the seller may prefer to reveal only the min-
imuim amount of material information required by CERCLA 5
For instance, a past violation may have been thoroughly reme-
died so as to have no lasting impact upon a site. However, even
the smallest violation could frighten a potential buyer and ruin
efforts by the seller for a sale. The seller's reluctance to dis-
close pertinent information to the buyer will be tempered by a
corresponding fear of liability for nondisclosure, misrepresen-
tation, fraud, or deceptive trade practices.' Despite that fear,
a seller will attempt to make the narrowest possible represen-
tations and warranties regarding the conditions of the property
in order to maximize price and limit liability.'
95. Regarding the seller's disclosure duties, the seller, as a person in charge of an
onshore facility, must report any release of a hazardous substance to the National
Response Center. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988). Section 9603 establishes this reporting
obligation and addresses other topics, such as penalties for failure to notify, § 9603(b),
and the E.P.A.'s authority to establish recordkeeping requirements, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(d). CERCLA also provides for public access to these records. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e)(2) (1988).
These two sections of the statute create no disclosure obligations in a seller/
property owner to a prospective buyer. However, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(c) (1988)
provides
. . . if the defendant [seller] obtained actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release or a hazardous substance at such facility when the
defendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred
ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such
knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1)
of the title and no defense under section 9607(a)(3) of this title shall be
available to such defendant.
(emphasis added). Despite this provision, the onus rests upon the prudent buyer to 1)
demand affirmative representations concerning the property and seller's activities, and
2) investigate the EPA's public records.
96. See United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 624 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Mass.
1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1987) (imposing penalties upon a party who failed to
respond to questions of the EPA). See also Louis S. Zimmerman, Environmental
Issues in Sales Transactions: The Seller's Perspective, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7, 8
(1988).
97. Zimmerman, supra note 96, at 41.
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B. Buyer's Preventive Measures: Risk Analysis and
Allocation
The assortment of preventive strategies from which a
buyer may choose to achieve its goals falls typically into two
successive phases: 1) analysis of the general and particular
risks associated with the purchase, and 2) distribution of these
risks. The first step requires gathering the requisite informa-
tion to locate and reduce risks. The second step involves allo-
cating contractually to the seller as many of those risks as
possible.
1. Risk Analysis-The Information Gathering Stage
From the buyer's point of view, more information will
allow for more realistic expectations, more forceful negotia-
tions, and fewer disputes. Therefore, the buyer must initially
gather information in order to identify all past and present
activities that could trigger a CERCLA suit. The buyer may
then use this information when deciding whether to continue
pursuing the deal and how to negotiate around contractual
conflicts with the seller.
a. The First Step: An Environmental Audit
The first step of the information gathering stage is the
environmental audit. Like any inspection that proceeds along
a checklist of items, the environmental audit reviews and
appraises the seller's compliance record, environmental control
systems, and environmental assets and liabilities.9" A thor-
ough environmental audit helps to quantify the market value
of the property, provides the specific factual bases for repre-
sentations and warranties, and helps to satisfy CERCLA's due
diligence requirements. 9 Perhaps most importantly, a thor-
ough environmental audit could lead to a successful assertion
of the innocent landowner defense. °°
An environmental audit consists of several components
that should be undertaken in increasing stages of intensity and
98. For a thorough, preventive law discussion of environmental audits, see
Courtney M. Price & Allen J. Danzig, Environmental Auditing: Developing a
"Preventive Medicine" Approach to Environmental Compliance, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1189 (1986).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) & (B) (1988).
100. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text for discussion of CERCLA
disclosure and landowner purchaser provisions.
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expense. If a significant problem is discovered at an early
stage, the buyer may avoid the unnecessary expense of a more
exhaustive audit. Likewise, if the preliminary phases reveal no
cause for suspicion, more expansive and expensive procedures
may not be necessary. 10 '
The first component of the audit involves requesting infor-
mation from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regarding any past or present compliance problems on the
property.0 2 The buyer should directly inquire whether there
are or have been any statutory violations on the site. The
buyer should also investigate the EPA records of adjacent
properties to determine whether any surrounding activities
pose a threat of contamination. If the property for sale does
appear on an agency list, the buyer should investigate the
EPA's files for more information. If this simple check exposes
potential liability, the buyer can walk away from the deal with
little loss of time or investment and avoid the prospect of
debilitating liabilities from ownership of a contaminated site.
Even if no problems appear during this first step, the
buyer's investigation should proceed. The EPA's identification
process is time-consuming and complex, and it has not identi-
fied all existing CERCLA violations. A buyer cannot rely on
101. Bradley M. Marten, Strategies for Minimizing Waste Liability in Real Estate
Transactions 646, 674 (4th Annual Hazardous Waste Law Management Conference,
University of Washington (1987)) (on file with University of Puget Sound Law
Review).
102. Hazardous waste sites are listed on the National Priorities List, otherwise
known as the Superfund list. The EPA also tracks and lists potentially hazardous
waste sites in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Information System (CERCLIS). This site-specific data base is valuable in
assessing the compliance status. A CERCLIS listing does not mean the site is
contaminated, only that a suspicion of contamination exists and that the EPA will be
investigating. Of course, that a site is not listed on CERCLIS does not mean that it is
contaminant-free. Information regarding the National Priorities List and CERCLIS
may be obtained from local and regional offices of the EPA.
If a prospective buyer cannot visit the EPA office library to review the CERCLIS
database, a buyer may request a copy of CERCLIS for the area of interest by mail. In
Region X (Alaska, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington), the EPA headquarters and library
are located at the United States EPA, Region 10, 1200 Sixth Ave., Seattle, WA 98101.
For requests by mail, the EPA has ten days to respond. Requests should be sent to:
Freedom of Information Office, United States EPA, 1200 Sixth Ave., M/S: MD13,
Seattle, WA 98101.
Other valuable sources of information are assessor's records, building permit
records, and title records. Although not discussed herein, the prospective purchaser
should also consult the state and local authorities charged with managing hazardous
waste pollution problems.
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the lack of EPA violations as an indication that the property is
not contaminated.
After the review of the EPA records, the environmental
audit proceeds to other accessible sources of critical informa-
tion: federal and state court and county and municipal govern-
ment records. The buyer should scrutinize all cases to which
the seller has been a party, checking whether environmental
contamination of the property to be purchased was an issue.
After these preliminary checks, the buyer should obtain
permission to review the seller's records relating to environ-
mental matters generally, any activities involving hazardous
substances, and possible contaminations of the property. This
third step could include a review of laboratory files, corporate
correspondence, or accounts receivable and payable. The
seller, if cooperative, can obviously be a valuable information
source. If the seller objects to any of the steps in the audit, the
buyer should be wary. An objection could signal that the seller
is trying to hide incriminating information. In conjunction
with the third step, the buyer should interview past and pres-
ent owners of the property and, if available, persons associated
with the activities conducted on the property. People to inter-
view include supervisors, plant managers, and other employees
with knowledge of the seller's waste management practices.
To document and supplement the interviews, the buyer
should present a detailed environmental questionnaire or dis-
closure statement for the seller to complete. This statement
requests the seller to disclose in writing any information bear-
ing on environmental issues, including:
a) current/former owners, uses of the property, and activi-
ties on the property (the seller may have conducted activ-
ities involving hazardous substances on the property
without causing a release; the disclosure questionnaire
should request information about these activities even
though they may no longer be a threat);
b) presence, use, storage, and disposal or hazardous waste
substances on the property, such as asbestos or PCBs,103
in addition to the presence of chemical or other storage
tanks and pipelines on the property;
c) compliance history of the property generally and, specifi-
103. "PCBs," polychlorinated biphenyls, are defined as "any chemical substance
that is limited to the biphenyl molecule that has been chlorinated to varying degrees




cally, records regarding: 1) past inspection of storage
tanks, groundwater, and soils; 2) any known spills or
leaks; 3) studies, memoranda or inspection reports on
waste management activities;
d) status and copies of all permits or licenses relating to the
handling of hazardous substances on the property;
e) activities involving water discharges and waste disposal.
The questionnaire should be tailored to the uses that occur
on the property. For instance, if the property has been used
for industrial purposes, the buyer should inquire about the
storage and use of raw materials for the industrial process or
the disposal of the industry's waste byproducts. If the property
has been used for agricultural purposes, the buyer should
investigate whether pesticides, herbicides, or other chemicals
have been used, stored, or spilled.
Finally, the buyer, buyer's counsel, and an experienced
environmental consultant should conduct a thorough on-site
inspection of the property. Environmental consultants are best
prepared to structure the course and content of the investiga-
tion. Although this inspection should proceed from a blank
slate, it should be guided, in part, by any information revealed
during the first three phases. Among other things, the inspec-
tion should include: a walking tour of the property; physical
analysis of groundwater, soils, and other samples; leak testing
of any underground storage tanks; and a review of geographi-
cal characteristics (e.g., the likelihood of floods, earthquakes or
other dangerous natural phenomena that could cause a release
of contaminants).
Once the audit is finished, the consultant should summa-
rize all the findings in a report for consideration by the buyer.
This report may serve another important function after the
purchase. If a CERCLA violation appears, the report can serve
as an evidentiary record of the buyer's due diligence, in an
attempt to satisfy the innocent landowner defense."° There-
fore, each step in the audit should be documented; even the
most preliminary efforts on the buyer's part can reveal a good
faith attempt to ascertain the possibility of contamination.
b. The Second Step: Evaluation of Identified Risks
With results of the environmental audit in hand, counsel
104. See supra notes 38, 46, and accompanying text.
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for the buyer should evaluate any identified liabilities, such as
the cost of cleaning up a contaminated sewage drain or the cost
of removing asbestos from a building. This evaluation should
be performed in recognition of the transaction's price, financ-
ing, and timing. Equipped with these results, the buyer can
make one of three choices: call the deal off, continue towards
closing the transaction as planned, or renegotiate the terms in
the purchase and sale agreement. Although hazardous waste
liabilities are often difficult to quantify, environmental consul-
tants may help ascribe a dollar figure to them. Although a
consultant's time is expensive, 0 5 the consultant's services can
be easily justified when the purchase is large."°
Of course, the final decision to purchase rests with the
buyer. To assist the buyer with this decision, counsel may
apply algebraic formulae in an attempt to evaluate the merits
of a purchase. This evaluation process often involves a signifi-
cant amount of forecasting, judgment, and conjecture about the
possibility and extent of liability. Ultimately, the benefits of
the purchase must outweigh the possible risks and the extent
of liabilities for contamination. For purposes of this evalua-
tion, the following two formulae are helpful: B > (R + L) X
P and D = M X P.
The first formula considers any risks, R, as calculated by
the environmental consultant plus any liabilities, L, as calcu-
lated by the buyer's counsel in light of the probability that
these risks and liabilities will occur, P. This figure, (R + L) X
P, must fall significantly short of the total benefits, B, of the
purchase, as judged by the buyer.
The second formula considers the magnitude of a
release,107 M, in light of the probability of its occurrence, P. M,
which contemplates the volume and type of release, expresses
the cleanup expense in dollars; P, which contemplates the like-
lihood of a release, expresses the possibility of a release as a
percentage. The product of these two factors yields a figure
105. Environmental consultants in the Puget Sound Region of Western
Washington charge, on the average, between $85-100 per hour for environmental
assessments. Because so many factors (including size, accessibility, history of
ownership and uses, and degree of contamination of the property) affect the scope of
an audit, it is difficult to state an average total cost of a typical audit.
106. For a complete review of the consultant's role, see Daniel H. Squire & Robert
J. Martineau, Jr., Environmental Consultants: Getting Your Money's Worth, 3 NAT.
RESOURCES AND ENV'T 23 (1988).




with which, depending on the status of the negotiations, the
buyer may negotiate to discount, D, the purchase price.
By no means do these formulae attempt to provide an
exact means for judging the merits of a purchase. Rather, as
counsel and client mull over whether to close a deal, the for-
mulae provide a conscious, deliberate device to sketch the
abstract, borderless economies of a real estate purchase where
CERCLA liabilities may impend.
Using these formulae, the buyer must develop negotiation
strategies, choose the highest acceptable price, and define any
limits beyond which he or she will not go. In addition, the
buyer should rank negotiation objectives so that during the
negotiations the buyer knows which objectives may be dis-
missed or compromised for the sake of the purchase. In cases
where CERCLA liabilities have been identified, the buyer
should approach the bargaining table aware of certain options.
Those options may include an elimination of certain sections of
the property from the purchase, an adjustment of the price, or
an arrangement where the seller performs a prepurchase
cleanup. Without gathering sufficient information and
delineating bargaining objectives, the buyer will approach the
bargaining table at a significant disadvantage and could later
be held responsible for disastrous hazardous waste liabilities.
2. Risk Allocation-The Contractual Drafting Stage
Because CERCLA allows parties to allocate risks between
themselves, the buyer may use several malleable contractual
devices to shield against future liability."08 Contract interpre-
tation governs the issue of liability for hazardous waste con-
tamination transfers."°  In reaching a decision, courts will
review the parties' mutual intentions at the time the contrac-
tual allocation was made."0 Most courts have held that state
108. Congress recognized the value of certain contractual allocations of risk. See
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)(1988) ("Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to
insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under
this section."). For a recent casenote on this subject, see Lynn E. Richter, AM
International v. International Forging Equipment: Does CERCLA Allow Private
Parties to Contractually Allocate Liability for Cleaning up Contaminated Sites?, 22 U.
TOL. L. REv. 1065 (1991) (discussing AM International, Inc. v. International Forging
Equipment, 743 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Ohio 1990), where court forbade contractual
allocation of CERCLA liability).
109. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (D.N.J. 1988).
110. Id.
1992]
494 University of Puget Sound Law Review
law governs such contracts.1 1 1
The following three subsections discuss three contractual
devices to avoid exposure to hazardous waste liability: escape
clauses, representations and warranties, and indemnification
clauses.
a. The Escape Cause: A Condition to Purchase
The first type of protection against CERCLA liability that
the buyer should include in the purchase and sale agreement is
an "escape clause." An escape clause resembles a condition
that allows a residential real estate buyer to inspect for termite
damage or other defects. If the environmental audit reveals
evidence of contamination, the clause gives the buyer the
option to avoid the agreement without penalty. The value of
the clause depends wholly on the quality of the environmental
audit; without a thorough audit, the buyer will not know
whether to proceed with the purchase. The following
paragraphs provide one example of an escape clause:
RIGHT TO CONDUCT ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION AS A
CONDITION TO PURCHASE
Seller agrees that Buyer may conduct an environmental
investigation of the subject property. The investigation must
be conducted no later than - days from the effective date
of this agreement. During the investigation and while in the
presence of the Seller or an authorized representative, the
Buyer and his Consultants shall have the right of access to
any portion of the subject property.
If the Buyer is dissatisfied with the results of the inves-
tigation, the Buyer may, in his sole discretion, elect to termi-
nate this agreement. The election to terminate may be
based only upon Buyer's dissatisfaction with the investiga-
tion results, not upon dissatisfaction with other aspects of
the purchase.
To terminate this agreement, the Buyer must send to
the Seller, or his attorney: 1) written notice of the intent to
terminate, and 2) a complete copy of the results of the inves-
tigation, including reference to the specific findings that
have caused the Buyer to elect to terminate the agreement.
111. See Lyncott Corp. v. Chem. Waste Management, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1052-53 (D. Ariz.
1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986). Specific examples of how courts have




This notice must be received by the Seller - days prior to
the date of closing.
Upon termination, this agreement will be void in all
respects. No liability shall attach to the Buyer by virtue of
the election to terminate, and all rights of either party to
this agreement shall cease.
This clause first establishes the right to and timing of an
investigation or audit. The clause then establishes the mecha-
nism and consequences of the buyer's termination. In addition
to these subjects, counsel for the buyer may want to include
provisions relating to two other topics: investigation expenses
and earnest money deposits.112 Given that an environmental
audit is expensive 113 and that the seller will most likely
request a copy of the investigation report for his records, the
buyer may negotiate to have the seller share in the expenses.
After all, if the buyer later walks away from the deal, the
seller will still keep the investigation results.
If the buyer does elect to withdraw from the purchase,
then he should receive the earnest money earlier deposited
into escrow. Counsel should draft a provision stating that, if
the buyer complies with the clause's timing and termination
procedures, the earnest money deposit will be returned to the
buyer.'14 On the other hand, if the buyer does not comply with
these procedures, the seller may keep the earnest money. This
twist should appeal to the seller and also serve as a means to
liquidate damages for breach of the condition." 5
b. Representations and Warranties
When drafting representations and warranties, most of the
subjects addressed reflect subjects investigated during the
audit stage. The representations attempt to guarantee the reli-
ability of the audit's earlier findings. Although the buyer can-
not expect the seller to make representations extending
beyond its control or knowledge, the buyer should seek to
112. Ralph H. Palumbo, Hazardous Waste Aspects of Negotiating and Drafting
Real Estate Sales Agreements: The Seller's Point of View 143, 175-79 (The Inaugural
Northwest Real Estate Symposium, University of Washington, November 16-18, 1989)
(on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
113. See supra note 105.
114. Purchase and Sale Documents 37 (The Inaugural Northwest Real Estate
Symposium, University of Washington, November 16-18, 1989) (on file with the
University of Puget Sound Law Review).
115. Id.
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maximize the seller's exposure. To give the representations
some teeth, the representations must be made to survive clos-
ing. Although the seller will try to avoid making broad repre-
sentations, there are several topics regarding the condition of
the property on which the buyer should encourage the seller to
represent and warrant:
a) That, during the Seller's ownership of the property, there
have been no releases of hazardous substances on the
property in question and that Seller has no knowledge of
any release on the property by any previous owners.
b) That Seller and previous owners have reported to the
EPA all leaks, spills, and other contaminations and that
Seller has cleaned up these contaminations to the
agency's satisfaction.
c) That Seller has faithfully responded to Buyer's disclosure
questionnaire and that the information reported therein
is true and correct to the best of Seller's knowledge.
d) That Seller is not or has not been a party to any action,
civil, criminal, or administrative (except as listed) involv-
ing the breach of CERCLA or other environmental stat-
utes and that Seller has not received any notice
concerning the violation of CERCLA provisions or future
suits involving these statutes.
e) That Seller has complied with all applicable environmen-
tal laws, rules, and regulations and that Seller's books
and records accurately reflect Seller's environmental
compliance history.
f) That Seller has given all required notifications and
acquired all the permits or licenses necessary for the law-
ful operation of Seller's business upon the property.
Seller has fully complied in all material respects with the
requirements of these authorizations. None of Seller's
activities on the property for sale will affect the renew-
ability of these licenses and permits. Seller has no knowl-
edge of any changes or events that will substantially alter
Buyer's ability to comply with environmental laws and to
obtain the necessary permits.
g) That neither Seller nor its predecessors has participated
in the disposal of any hazardous substance from the prop-
erty for sale, at an off-site location or at a designated
Superfund site (except as listed).
If any of these representations needs to be modified to
account for an exception, such as an instance of regulated
dumping of hazardous substances at a Superfund site, then the
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buyer must draft the representation for factual accuracy. Not
only should the subjects of the representations follow the sub-
jects addressed in the audit, the language of the representa-
tions should follow the precise language of the statute. This
suggestion applies equally to other sections of the agreement
that address CERCLA, including any conditions and indemnifi-
cation provisions. For instance, if the representations discuss"releases," "hazardous substances," "enforcement actions," or
"natural resources damages," then the contract should define
these terms consistently with CERCLA.
c. Indemnification Provisions
In an indemnification clause, the indemnitor undertakes to
secure or hold harmless and to restore or compensate the
indemnitee in the case of a loss or liability. Indemnification is
an indispensable element in the buyer's purchase agreement.
One court explained the value of indemnification clauses in
CERCLA actions: "[I]ndemnity is a fault-shifting mechanism,
available to a defendant who is held liable to a plaintiff by
operation of law, but who seeks recovery from the party actu-
ally responsible for the loss.""' 6
The buyer, as the indemnitee rather than the indemnitor,
should not rely on general clauses when drafting an indemnifi-
cation provision.117 Rather, the buyer should specify in the
clause those liabilities that the seller will assume. Because
such provisions are typically strictly construed against the
indemnitee's interests, the provision's success will depend upon
its clarity and precision.118  Moreover, when drafting these
clauses, the buyer and seller must remember that their agree-
ment can only allocate liability between themselves: the agree-
ment cannot "affect rights of a stranger to the contract."'" 9
116. Con-Tech Sales Defined Ben. Trust v. Cockerham, 715 F. Supp. 701, 705 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (citing to Sirianni v. Nugent Brothers, Inc., 506 A.2d 868, 871 (1986)).
117. Caveat: Given the unlimited variety of circumstances that may exist when
drafting, every transaction demands well-tailored language. All drafters must craft
clauses that answer all the factors of the situation at hand; drafters should not rely on
the following clauses as sufficient in every case.
118. Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, cert denied, 795 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1989); Straub Clinic and Hosp., Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 665 P.2d 176 (Haw.
1983); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Parker Henry Glass Co., 7 Wash. App. 208, 499 P.2d 21
(1972).
119. Grant-Howard Assoc. v. General Housewares Corp., 482 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct.
App. 1984). By virtue of § 9607(e)(1), "strangers to the contract" includes the federal
government. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 448 U.S. 1029 (1989).
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Below is a sample indemnification clause favoring the
buyer:
Seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Buyer
from and against any liability, civil or criminal or adminis-
trative, and any expense, including attorneys' fees and dis-
bursements, which:
1) is asserted against or incurred by Buyer, its succes-
sors, assigns, and lenders by any party, including federal,
state, county, and municipal authorities or private parties;
and
2) arises directly or indirectly as a consequence of any
contamination of any property, including the subject prop-
erty, by a release of hazardous substances. 120
This indemnity applies to contaminations that:
1) cause or result in any adverse environmental effect,
injury or death to any person, or other violation of CER-
CLA; and
2) exist at or before the date of closing. 121
Seller's obligation to indemnify Buyer shall survive the
date of closing and exists in addition to any representations
or warranties made by Seller regarding the subject property
and this transaction as a whole.
A sophisticated seller will probably balk at the breadth of
this clause. From a buyer's point of view, however, it is best to
draft broadly. Then, when negotiating, the buyer may appease
the seller's reservations about a broad indemnity by offering
certain concessions, such as a monetary or temporal limit to
the indemnification. These limits, or bargaining tools, allow
the buyer to placate the seller while preserving a valuable deal
in which the buyer is protected. In addition, the buyer can
point out that the seller should not have any qualms about a
reasonable indemnification if 1) the seller faithfully responded
to the questionnaire, 2) the audit revealed no contamination,
and 3) the seller does not indemnify the buyer for any releases
caused by the buyer.
One last important point regarding indemnification is that
the value of even the most watertight clause rests upon the
120. This clause or the whole purchase agreement should incorporate the
definitions of these and other statutory terms by reference.
121. Note: The Seller's indemnity does not apply to contaminations that occur
after closing. If the time at which a contamination occurred is not ascertainable, the




seller's ability to pay when the clause is invoked.'2 Thus, the
buyer must ensure that the seller has committed sufficient
finances to secure the seller's promises after closing. Several
means exist to secure the seller's ability to pay. Traditional
methods include letters of credit, escrow, deposits, or bonds.1 2 1
The parties can also negotiate for the seller to purchase insur-
ance. Although courts have largely construed "comprehensive
general liability" (CGL) insurance policies as excluding cover-
age for pollution," certain "environmental impairment liabil-
ity" (EIL) policies are available.1x
A strong funding provision not only ensures that money
exists to pay for the cleanup, but also removes any incentive
the seller may have to make an opportunistic breach. An
opportunistic breach could occur if the penalty provisions are
less than the costs anticipated in an environmental cleanup
cost recovery action. The indemnification and funding mecha-
nism must financially bind the seller and make breaching the
clause economically unwise, thereby forcing the seller to honor
the contractual obligation to reimburse the buyer for CERCLA
cleanup expenses. 126
Because of the disabling size of hazardous waste pollution
liability, however, the buyer will encounter significant resist-
ance to any broad indemnification provision or any seller com-
mitment to maintain funding after closing. Therefore, the
buyer may be forced to consider creative and alternative fund-
ing mechanisms, such as captive insurance policies, insurance
pooling arrangements, and trust funds."2
122. See generally J. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks III, Corporate Director and
Officer Indemnifwation: Alternative Methods for Funding, 24 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
53, 58 (1989).
123. Id. at 55.
124. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken and Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988);
Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987). But see
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Hazen Paper v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Boeing v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
125. Prospective buyers may consider the Pollution Liability Insurance
Association or the American Insurance Group as sources of EIL insurance policies.
For a review of insurance issues in this context, see Thomas A. Gordon & Roger
Westendorf, Liability Coverage for Toxic Tort, Hazardous Waste Disposal and Other
Pollution Ezposures, 25 IDAHo L. REv. 567 (1988-89).
126. See Carlton & Brooks, supra note 122, at 56-57.
127. The discussion of the intricacies of these funding mechanisms is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For an introduction to traditional and alternative funding
mechanisms, see Carlton & Brooks, supra note 122.
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C. Case Law Interpretations of Private Party
Indemnification
In many cases, well drafted indemnification provisions
have served to immunize parties from CERCLA liability. This
section analyzes actual clauses from four cases. Judicial inter-
pretations of these clauses provide instructive guidance for
drafting enforceable contractual transfers of CERCLA
liability.
CERCLA sections 9607(e)(1) and (2) address the subject of
private indemnification provisions."z As a general rule, when
interpreting sections 9607(e)(1) and (2), courts across the coun-
try have held that indemnification agreements are not enforce-
able against the government but that they are enforceable
against private parties.'
In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., the Northern Dis-
trict of California court explained the rule and its policy:
[P]rivate parties are free to contract among themselves with
respect to indemnification and contribution.... [P]arties are
jointly and severally liable with respect to the government
in order to insure that the taxpayers are not forced to bear
the cost of responding to the illegal disposal of hazardous
substances .... [This] rule . .. has great appeal in that it
assures that responsible parties rather than taxpayers will
bear the cost of responding to the illegal dumping of hazard-
ous substances without unduly limiting the freedom of pri-
vate parties to contractually distribute the risk of liability.' 30
The indemnity provision in Jones-Hamilton provided as
follows:
[Plaintiff-Jones-Hamilton Co.] agrees to comply with all
applicable Federal, State and local laws, ordinances, codes,
rules and regulations and to indemnify [defendants-Kop-
Coat, Inc.] against all losses, damages and costs resulting
128. See supra note 15. Channel Master Satellite Sytems, Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp.,
702 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1988) ("The thrust of § 107(e) is that although one may not
deny liability for response costs by virtue of an indemnity or hold harmless agreement,
such agreements to indemnify are not eliminated by the strict liability provisions of
CERCLA.").
129. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert denied, 448 U.S. 1029 (1989); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d
1454 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
130. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(interpreting the Ninth Circuit rule announced in Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1454).
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from any failure of [plaintiff] or any of its employes [sic],
agents or contractors to do so.131
This clause was written to indemnify Kop-Coat, suppliers of
hazardous raw materials, from any liabilities arising out of
Jones-Hamilton's facility that fabricated wood preservation
compounds. The court generously upheld the clause as a valid
transfer of risk from all damages, including CERCLA liability,
even though the clause was written ten years before CERCLA
was enacted.132
In contrast to the court's broad and forgiving construction
in Jones-Hamilton, the Eastern District of North Carolina
applied, to one seller's detriment, a rigid and merciless con-
struction of a similar indemnification clause in Channel Master
Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp. 33 After Chan-
nel Master purchased thirteen acres of real estate from JFD
Electronics in 1985, it elected to spend over three million dol-
lars to clean up groundwater and soil contamination as a step
toward obtaining state and federal permits. Despite an indem-
nification clause in the sales agreement protecting JFD Elec-
tronics, Channel Master sued for indemnification and
contribution for the cleanup expenses pursuant to CERCLA
section 9607(a). The indemnification language provided that:
All notes or notices of violations of law or municipal ordi-
nances, orders or requirements noted in or issued by the
Departments of Buildings, Fire, Labor, Health or other state
or municipal departments having jurisdiction (collectively
"Violations") affecting the Property at the date of this con-
tract shall be conveyed free of the same; .... Buyer agrees
to indemnify and to hold Seller and its respective successors
and assigns harmless from and against all actions, claims,
penalties, damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees,
incurred by Seller resulting from any Violations against or
affecting the Property .... P4
Channel Master argued that JFD Electronics was liable as
a previous owner/operator of a facility at which contamination
had occurred. JFD Electronics' attempt to use the indemnifi-
cation clause as a defense were to no avail. Despite the clause's
obvious intent to relieve JFD Electronics of certain liabilities
131. Jones-Hamilton Co., 750 F. Supp. at 1023.
132. Id. at 1028.
133. 702 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
134. Channel Master Satellite Systems, 702 F. Supp. at 1230 (emphasis added).
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after the sale, the court ruled that "[t]he indemnity clause, by
its language, [was] not related to violations of federal law, and
therefore [was] not applicable to Channel Master's claim.""
Although courts traditionally construe indemnification
clauses against the drafter's interests, 1" Jones-Hamilton and
Channel Master demonstrate that one cannot predict whether
a court will interpret such a clause generously or rigidly. As a
result, buyers aiming to limit their liability must draft the
clause as broadly yet precisely as possible.
Two other cases involving real estate transactions provide
guidance for drafting indemnification provisions and how to
secure their enforcement by the courts. In Versatile Metals,
Inc. v. Union Corp., the vendor-lessor agreed to indemnify the
purchasers-lessees if any hazardous waste contamination
occurred on the property before the date the purchasers took
possession of the property. 37 Specifically, the "Asset Purchase
Agreement" provided that:
Seller . . . represent[s] and warrant[s] to Buyer that as of
November 26, 1984 the land included in the Leased Premises
was free of contamination in violation of any applicable fed-
eral, state, or local law or regulation relating to the protec-
tion of health, safety, and environment. Seller... agree[s] to
indemnify and hold Buyer harmless from any and all costs,
damages, liabilities and expenses resulting from hazardous
waste . .. provided that . .. Buyer acts in the following
manner:
(a) Buyer shall keep all Inventory purchased hereunder
segregated from any other inventories of Buyer;
(b) Buyer shall give seller [sic] prompt telephone notice
. .. upon discovery of capacitors or other items in such
inventory that may contain hazardous waste and shall at the
sole expense, risk and liability of Seller cooperate with
Seller in Seller's removal and shipment of such items; and
(c) Buyer shall act in a reasonable manner both before
and after discovery of items containing hazardous wastes in
order to prevent leakage and otherwise minimize contamina-
tion or other damage.13
After the purchaser, Versatile Metals, took possession, it
found the property was heavily contaminated. In reviewing
135. I& at 1232.
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
137. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
138. Id at 1568.
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Versatile Metals' claim to recover response costs from Union
Corp., the court acknowledged that the above provision could
serve as a valid transfer of risk. The court found, however,
that Versatile Metals had failed to comply with the indemnifi-
cation's conditions (a), (b), and (c). As a consequence, the
court barred Versatile Metals from invoking the provision's
protection despite the clause's explicit allocation of responsibil-
ity to the seller. Therefore, the court held Versatile Metals
responsible for any contamination occurring from its actions
after the purchase.' 39
The Versatile Metals decision provides two obvious les-
sons. First, the purchaser should satisfy all conditions in the
indemnification clause. Second, the purchaser should consider
drafting an indemnification provision free from conditions that
may make compliance difficult. 4 °
In Emhart Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International, Inc.,
the buyer, Emhart Industries, had been negotiating the
purchase of real estate and manufacturing plants in three dif-
ferent states when it learned the seller had used PCBs in their
manufacturing processes.' 4 ' As a result, Emhart Industries
insisted on contractual protection from liability for PCB pollu-
tion. The sellers agreed to indemnify Emhart Industries for
Any obligation, liability, loss, damage or expense, of
whatever kind or nature, contingent or otherwise, known or
unknown, incurred under, or imposed by, any provision of
Federal, state or local law or regulation, or common law,
pertaining to health, safety or environmental protection and
arising out of any act or omission by Seller, its employees or
representatives prior to the Closing Date, including, without
limitation, such laws or regulations pertaining to the storage,
transportation, handling, disposal, discharge, presence or use
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) or any substance con-
taining PCBs.142
Later, after Emhart began operating the purchased plants,
the amount of PCBs discharged at one of the plants had not
139. I& at 1573.
140. On the other hand, if the seller is unwilling to agree to an unconditional
indemnification provision, conditions can serve as a buyer's valuable bargaining tools.
The buyer must remember to offer conditions that will not interfere with the buyer's
later use of the property and that will not be difficult to satisfy.
141. Emhart Industries, Inc. v. Duracell International, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987).
142. Id. at 555-56.
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diminished. The discharge levels were high enough to endan-
ger the health of the plant's employees and to force Emhart to
shut the plant down. 43 Because neither seller was eager to
honor the indemnification agreements, Emhart sued. The Ten-
nessee district court upheld the risk transfer provisions, enti-
tling Emhart to recover all PCB cleanup costs."
As in Channel Master, however, the court strictly con-
strued the indemnification provision and therefore rejected
another of Emhart's claims for indemnification. On the issue
of whether Emhart's response measures were economically
efficient, the district court stated that "the indemnity does not
require that Duracell underwrite the most economically pro-
ductive solution to the... PCB problem.' '1 45
These four cases illustrate that environmental problems
rarely come in manageable sizes and shapes. Moreover, they
are typically concealed from easy observation, often not mani-
festing themselves until years after closing. Unfortunately, no
indemnification provisions for minimizing hazardous waste lia-
bilities have been universally accepted. Therefore, unless the
seller agrees to a sweeping indemnity, which is unlikely, a
buyer's counsel must explicitly specify those liabilities from
which the buyer is protected. Otherwise, as occurred in Chan-
nel Master and Versatile Metals, the courts most likely will
construe the indemnity strictly, favoring the indemnitor-the
seller.
D. General Drafting and Negotiation Techniques
When drafting and negotiating indemnification clauses, as
well as all elements of the purchase agreement, the buyer
should be aware of certain points on which compromise may
turn, such as the temporal and financial objectives of each
party. The process of negotiation is not a question of choosing
between discrete options. Rather, the risks, responsibilities,
and profits rest upon a continuum between the seller's and
buyer's opposing objectives.
The central elements of the transaction-price, timing and
risk allocation---can all be manipulated to varying degrees in
order to consummate the purchase. A well-informed buyer is
better situated during the negotiation process. When bargain-
143. Id at 562, 566-67.
144. I& at 574-75.
145. Id. at 571.
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ing, the buyer will then be able to present a variety of options
to the seller.
For instance, if hazardous waste pollution is known or
likely, one option might be a large price reduction with limited
post-closure obligations on the seller. Another option might
involve no price reduction but relatively unlimited post-closure
obligations on the seller. If some portion of the property is
contaminated, the purchase could exclude that area from the
transaction. A seller, understandably, will be averse to bear
any post-closure responsibility for CERCLA liability. In order
to protect its own interests, the buyer must assuage the seller's
aversion by carefully arranging the dimensions and scope of
the purchase agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
No buyer can completely protect itself from liability for
hazardous waste contamination. The prospect of huge environ-
mental liability need not, however, discourage all real estate
transactions. By means of thorough preparation, informed
negotiation, and precise drafting, buyer's counsel can shift
many of the risks of CERCLA liability. The prophylactic strat-
egies and devices discussed in this Comment can shield a
buyer's interests against crippling CERCLA liabilities.
As environmental risks become more prominent, these
techniques will become more valuable as a means to minimize
the buyer's exposure to CERCLA liability. Manipulation of
these and other approaches eases the bargaining process and
protects the buyer from another party's hazardous waste mis-
management. Buyers must still approach certain real estate
transactions with extreme caution and patience, keeping in
mind that the statute and accompanying case law have not yet
reached a state of equilibrium. Considerable variation remains
in the legal community's interpretation of this imposing stat-
ute. Nevertheless, these prepurchase precautions can help
avoid postpurchase obligations.
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